Die Offizier Corps
(The Officer Corps)
Curators Notes
So I wished to start by saying thank you to Mr. Joe Robinson for making this article on his seperate website, and for allowing me to repost it on the Kaiser Krieg website. I thank the good Colonel and his wife for their kindness.
I salute you!
Part 1 - The Basics
On 1 October 1913, the German Army numbered 30,029 officers (23,346 from Prussia, 3,322 from Bavaria, 2,247 from Saxony and 1,114 from Württemberg). This total did not include the 222 officers in supernumery positions. Just one year later that total number had grown to 76,000—26,000 of whom were regular officers and 25,000 from the reserve. There were several types of officers, although this chapter concentrates on combatant officers. In this category were three grade groups: general officers; field grade officers or Stabsoffiziere (major, lieutenant colonel, colonel); and regimental officers, usually in the ranks of captain and lieutenant (Dienstgradgruppen). In addition to the combat arms, there were various technical officers. These officers were graded on a scale that paralleled the ranks of combatant officers. There were medical officers (Sanitätsoffiziere); veterinary officers (Veterinäroffizier); ordnance and artificer officers (Zeug und Feuerwerksoffiziere), (seldom promoted above captain); and fortress construction officers (Festungsbauoffiziere).
Historically, these officers had been from the nobility, but the wartime build-up required additional manpower. This change in status created a conundrum. There were three classes of people within imperial Germany—the nobility and the traditional old officer families, the middle class or bourgeoisie (some were quite rich, but their families were without the benefit of nobility), and the lower class or proletariat. In a key order dated 29 March 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm II opened the door to an expanded officer corps with what he termed erwüncshte Kreise (desired personal/social background). This change provided imperial guidance for the selection of officers and an admission that the numbers of blood nobility were insufficient to meet the task at hand. The commonly held belief was that the nobility were of good solid stock and could be counted on when loyalty was paramount. Expansion of the army mandated that imperial Germany begin accepting others into the fold, so the nobles had to find ways to restrict entry, and they did so by admitting only those who had the “right attitude.”
This policy was not a totally new idea. As early as 1786, when Frederick the Great died, 10 percent of the officers were members of the middle class. In 1861, a little more than 40 percent of the army was non-noble. One of the great military theoreticians of the time, Colmar von der Goltz, repeatedly argued that an aristocratic background was required as aristocrats were in the habit of commanding others. He believed fewer nobles would lead to a breakdown in military discipline and the blurring of the line between enlisted and officer ranks. Further, only aristocrats would have the tie to the Kaiser, and only they could be relied upon. The following table indicates how matters stood in 1861. As is shown, the Prussian aristocracy favored the cavalry and infantry guards.
Share of Nobility
Types of Regiments
Percentage of Nobles
Infantry Garde 95%
Infantry Line 67%
Cavalry Garde 100%
Cavalry Line 95%
Artillery Gardes 67%
Artillery Line 16%
Pioneers (Engineers) 16%
The nobility’s feelings toward the other branches were really historic in nature. One historian of renaissance Italy referred to the artillery as “this pestilential armament.” As to the pioneers or engineers (middle class soldiers), historically they were not soldiers at all. They had been civilians who were hired to dig and construct the siege works.
Part 2 - The Basics
Prussia was the most obdurate of the contingents, but understood that the need to fill officer vacancies was of paramount concern. The other contingents more readily accepted officers from the middle class. In Saxony after 1866, for instance, some members of the Guelph aristocracy from the former Kingdom of Hannover joined Saxon service. This policy led to a concentration of aristocracy within certain Saxon regiments. [Infantry Regiments 100, 101, 108, Jäger Battalions 12 and 13, and some cavalry regiments.] A bad joke was often told that it was never clear if any given toast to His Majesty the King went to the King of Saxony or the King of Hannover. By 1890, Saxony had only 19 percent nobility in its officer corps. Württemberg had only 25 percent nobles after unification. Bavaria, the most liberal-minded state, had only 15 percent nobles in its officer corps. In that army only the Abitur was a prerequisite for a regular Army commission as of 1890.
Although the change was a necessity, the Prussian nobility simply would not integrate with the middle class, so élite regiments were formed. Initially, all nobles went to cavalry regiments, but not all could afford the extra expense of maintaining a horse, so Foot Guard Regiments were formed. Unlike the elite Foot Guard Regiments, middle class soldiers were found in Pioneer and Foot Artillery Regiments. As more and more middle class officers with better skills and test scores entered the ranks, instructors were given greater leeway to give extra credit to candidates with a good attitude (noble upbringing). A non-passing score could be rescued by deportment. Likewise, if a proletarian had managed to enroll in an officer’s course, a superb score could be made into a fail by his “attitude.” However, even this reluctant willingness to accept middle class officers did not fix the shortages. Eight percent of the infantry officer requirements were unfilled in 1889. Fifty-six infantry regiments received no applications for commission in 1902.
By 1913, 70 percent of the Prussian officers came from middle-class families, but regimental exclusiveness did not end. In 1913, 80 percent of cavalry officers, 48 percent of infantry officers, and 41 percent of field artillery officers were from noble families. A few middle class individuals known as “Concession Joes” (Konzessionschulzes) made it into the Guard regiments but were not very welcome. There was a lack of prestige in technical schools, despite the fact that these schools made greater demands on their students. By 1913, 48 percent of the generals were middle class. When promoted to the position of commanding general of an army corps, bourgeois generals became nobility “automatically.”
The aristocracy also favored regiments that were located in major urban areas. In 1913, 61 percent of the regiments in the Prussian Army were more than 50 percent noble and 16 regiments were exclusively aristocratic. The 3. Garde- Regiment zu Fuß had 67 aristocrats and no non-nobles. Infanterie-Regiment Graf Bose (1. Thüringisches) Nr. 31 in Altona had 47 nobles and six non-nobles; Braunschweigisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 92 in Brunswick had a split of 44 nobles and 10 from the middle class. By comparison, 8. Ostpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 45 east of the Elbe had two aristocrats and 50 non-nobles. Most cavalry regiments were entirely noble; however, Dragoner-Regiment Prinz Albrecht von Preußen (Litthauisches) Nr. 1 in Tilsit had a split of three nobles and 24 non-nobles. Field artillery regiments in large cities, such as Feldartillerie-Regiment von Peucker (1. Schlesisches) Nr. 6 in Breslau had a split of 29 nobles and six middle class; whereas, Feld Artillerie-Regiment Prinz August von Preußen (1. Litthauisches) Nr. 1 in Gumbinnen and Insterburg had a split of three nobles and 40 non-nobles. Foot artillery was almost entirely non-noble including the Guards Foot Artillery whose split was 10 noble and 37 non-nobles. Pioneers were also considered technical, and pioneer battalions in large cities routinely had no nobles. Regiments that relocated their garrisons would often lose their nobles, such as Schleswig-Holsteinisches Ulanen-Regiment Nr. 15 when it relocated to a frontier garrison; it went from a split of 25 nobles and three non-nobles to seven nobles and 17 non-nobles. The General Staff was usually not noble and valued professional efficiency above all. Eighty-three percent of the officers were Protestant as opposed to 62 percent of the population.
Service with the I (Eastern Prussia) and XVI (Metz) Army Corps was particularly undesirable. Their regiments were located in less attractive garrisons close to the Russian and French borders, and that resulted in more drills, alarms, and exercises. Additionally, for many years, both army corps had very demanding commanding generals leading to a well-known rhyme among army officers: “Gott bewahr mich vor der Grenze – vor Gottlieb Haeseler und August Lentze!” (May God protect me from serving at the border – with Gottlieb v. Haeseler and August v. Lentze).
Part 3 - The Youth
Cadet schools were completely separate from the Volkschule and Gymnasium discussed in the last officer blog. A man could enter a lower cadet school (Voranstalt) and remain within the cadet system until he graduated from the upper cadet school. Movement between civilian schools and cadet schools certainly happened in both directions. There were eight Prussian lower cadet schools located in Bensberg, Köslin (formerly Culm), Karlsruhe, Naumburg, Oranienstadt, Plön, Potsdam, and Walstadt. There was also a lower cadet school in Dresden, Saxony and one in lower Bavaria. The Prussian upper cadet school was called the Hauptkadettenanstalt (HKA) and was located at Gross-Lichterfelde. Not only Prussian, but also Württemberg and some Saxon cadets, aspired to attend the Prussian upper cadet school. Bavarian cadet schools stood alone and arguably were always better. The Abitur was a prerequisite for commissioning in the Bavarian army.
Cadets were an interesting group. By 1910, two-thirds of the cadets were non-noble. The major investiture was the quasi-formal clothing ceremony. This picture of a Saxon cadet shows how indifferent the issuers were for the size of the uniforms of the lower cadet schools. Prussian lower cadets did not wear helmets, but each school had a unique uniform. If the uniform was too large, the cadet had no recourse but to grow into it. Cadet life seemed to revolve around efforts to find food, as their normal fare was inadequate.
There were never many cadets. A Voranstalt had 200 or fewer students. The HKA at Gross-Lichterfelde had 1,000 cadets and produced about 240 officers per year. These cadets mostly entered the army as officer candidates shortly before commission, in the rank of Fähnrich. The number of civilians entering the active army with Fahnenjunker status varied from twice as many cadets to about the same number. As to religion, while 38 percent of Germans were Catholic, less than four percent of the cadets were Catholic. This disparity shows the religious discrimination in the selection process as well a requirement that the Prussian officers raise their children as Protestants.
The cost of schooling was a major issue. One of the attractions of cadet school was that scholarships to the “Kings Cadets” could be quite substantial. Reduction or elimination of tuition fees was available. This was granted almost automatically for the sons of officers, as well as for certain non-commissioned officers, civil servants, and gendarmes. The emancipation of students became a major concern of families. Commissioning and self-sufficiency were urgent considerations. Families had to decide very early (when the boy was age nine) whether to bear this expense or not. The student graduation year, seniority, and long-term benefits differed between the cadet schools. There were three distinct methods of leaving the cadet schools. The fastest and most direct method, and the one that applied to most cadets, was to leave the HKA after the Obersekunda year and enter a regiment as a charakterisierter (brevet) Fähnrich (at age 17). Option two was to be selected as a Prima cadet gaining the Abitur (at age 19). Option three was for a very élite group called the Selekta, which was in charge of the other cadets for the period of one year (at age 18).
At the end of six cadet years or at the age of 17, the cadets took the Fähnrich exam and those that left the Academy merged into the commissioning process. The cadet was a little different because he was a charakterisierter Fähnrich.There were exceptions, as some 10 percent of the cadets left the academy with some advanced training and were considered Patent Fähnrich. If a cadet did really well on the Fähnrich exam, he could be selected as a Selekta cadet and remain at the school. Selekta became cadet non-commissioned officers and “ran” the non-senior cadets in the following year. This position was prestigious; if the individual passed the officer’s exam, he was commissioned. There was no need for the officers of the regiment to vote on Selekta. A cadet could also compete to be a Prima cadet. This policy was selective and could lead the candidates to continue at the HKA for two years, with the goal of gaining the Abitur (at age 19). Being a Selekta cadet helped him for the rest of his military life. The Abitur was a civilian life advantage. As such, the number of military Abitur holders grew steadily from one-third in 1880 to two-thirds in 1912. The number of middle class officers who saw the lifelong civilian advantages of the Abitur became dominant.
Inside the cadet corps, social class was non-existent. One anachronistic institution existed that ran counter to this classless society. The Corps of Pages was open only to the children of nobles. By an order of 1878, pages were drawn from the two highest classes of the HKA. A page had to be successful in his own right and had to have been selected to enter the ranks of the Prima or the Selekta. Thirty cadets were chosen as Leibpagen and 30 additional cadets were chosen as Hofpagen. Leibpagen directly served a member of the royal family. Hofpagen performed general duties at the imperial Court. When on official duties, the pages dressed in 18th century uniforms with the Leibpagen having a more ornate dress. Those cadets who had exposure to royalty and the court were highly successful. Forty-seven percent of those Selekta who were pages became generals.
Part 4 - The Steps
The steps to becoming an officer were aimed at ensuring that the right personnel were accepted. As with all things related to commissioning, there were, of course, exceptions. Sometimes, it may appear that there were more exceptions than rules, but these ten steps outline the basics. The route to commissioning was similar for the civilian Fahnenjunker and the Fähnrich from the cadet schools, but there were exceptions. Rabenau, a German military author of the time, identified six different steps. These steps were designed for active officers. Reserve officers took a different track that I will eventually explain on another blog. In addition to the exceptions, there were many differences in the length of time devoted to commissioning, including the cost and the final educational level. Dates of rank varied significantly.
Step 1 — Select a Regiment to Join.
All guard and cavalry regiments actively recruited nobles to keep the regiments as “pure” as possible. A variety of methods was used to lure young noblemen, including fancy uniforms and depot locations near fashionable, large towns. Guard and cavalry units could expect additional income of 1,000 Mark per month from these candidates who would pay to belong to the units. The more remote, lower-regarded regiments often had problems attracting new recruits. Despite this difficulty, they insisted on a rigid class and social selection process. This maintenance of high social standards resulted in a shortage of officers. Officially, the blame was placed on the middle-class for not wanting to wade through the army’s prejudices. Even until 1918, regiments tried to keep up the illusion of a “noble” officer corps with a personal relationship to the Kaiser.
Step 2 — Get a Regimental Colonel to Sponsor You.
Sponsorship was key and perhaps the most difficult step on the ladder. Both the candidate and his family were scrutinized carefully. The candidate had to have a sufficient income because the regimental commander and the current officers did not want to accept men who might get into financial difficulty. Vera von Etzel tells a touching story about how Artur v. Klingspor made it into the Kürassier-Regiment von Seydlitz (Magdeburgisches) Nr.7. The clothing and equipment was very expensive at that time and a burden even for his father, Lieutenant General Leo v. Klingspor. Artur’s father underwrote him, and he received his commission, but the support came only after his younger brother, Hans Arvid, died while at the academy. Perhaps the loss of a son persuaded his father to ensure that his surviving son was in the best regiment.
After selecting a regiment, the candidate’s father introduced him to the regimental commander, who approved every volunteer applying to the regiment. The enormous cost of a premier regiment would keep the regiments populated by the more affluent—the “vons.” The father of the candidate and his son went to a dinner to be seen by all in a one-night precursor to Step 8.The commander then determined whether or not to accept the new officer candidate, called either Offiziers-Aspirant or Avantageur. Then the officer candidate had to successfully pass the Fähnrich examination, which was taken in front of a special examination committee (Oberexaminationskommission) in Berlin. The commander would not give final approval until the candidate passed this Fähnrich exam. Cramming with a tutor for the exam was a standard practice.
Those who were not cadets attempted to be selected as Fahnenjunker. This rank went through several iterations in an attempt to make it more professional. Prior to 1900, the regimental commander promoted the candidates after six months to the rank of Fähnrich. After 1900, more stringent criteria were enacted in an endeavor to end nepotism. The criteria required the candidate for Fahnenjunker to have a one-year certificate but not the Abitur. Then prior to selection, the candidate had to pass a specific written test of general knowledge. If the individual passed, he enrolled as a Fahnenjunker and was allowed to take the Fähnrich examination. In infantry and dragoon regiments, he was known as a Fahnenjunker; in other cavalry regiments, a Fahnenjunker was referred to as a Kornett or a Standartenjunker. In artillery regiments, the individual was called a Stückjunker. The amount of time spent as a Fahnenjunker varied a great deal.
Step 3 – Pass the Fähnrich Examination
In theory, each candidate was supposed to have a Prima certificate (Primareiferzeugnis) or special dispensation to take the Fähnrich examination. Ninety percent had a Prima certificate and 75 percent passed the Fähnrich exam the first time. A man could take it again; few failed the second time. If indeed there was a second failure, candidates were transferred into the ranks as an enlisted soldier or Unteroffizier. In 1890, the Kaiser demanded grading leniency for this examination. If leniency still did not work, he used dispensations that totaled over 1,000 between 1901 and 1912. There still were failures. In 1878, eight cadets failed the exam. All eight eventually were made Fähnrich, and six of them earned their commission. Manfred von Richthofen, the Red Baron, failed the examination and was sent to the Ulanen-Regiment Kaiser Alexander III. von Rußland (Westpreußisches) Nr. 1 as an Unteroffizier. Eight months later, he was made a Fähnrich and eventually was commissioned. This promotion put his date of rank behind his classmates of 1911.
Step 4 — Spend Time in the Regimental Ranks
A patent or charakterisierter Fähnrich was a graduate of a Kadettenschule, who served with a regiment before gaining his commission. A Fahnenjunker was an officer candidate who held a certificate from a Gymnasium and who had passed the required examination in military subjects and served with a regiment before obtaining his commission. The non-cadet individuals who passed the Fähnrich exam joined the cadet Fähnriche and moved into the regiment as a Gemeiner (private) but were referred to as an Avantageur. Officially, the title was Offizieraspirant—that title was officially changed in 1899 to Fahnenjunker. He lived in the barracks for a period that varied by regiment from one to six weeks. He started as a Gemeiner and when he moved out of the barracks became a Gefreiter. A Patent Fähnrich was never a private but a Gefreiter. He bore all costs associated with his service in the same way as a one-year volunteer. At this point, he could also have a civilian batman (personal servant).
When promoted to Unteroffizier, he was permitted to dine in the officers’ mess. At this point, he was called a Fähnrich. A Fähnrichsvater was appointed to be his mentor. The Fähnrichsvater was responsible for the practical military education of his officer candidates, although long drinking bouts were commonplace. While the Fähnrich was encouraged to spend freely, indebtedness was a major embarrassment for the entire mess. The amount of time spent in Step Four decreased dramatically. At first, it was five to six months and then, by the turn of the century, it was three months (two if the individual came from a cadet school). Eventually, the time in the ranks was so short that men had insufficient time to absorb the necessary understanding of the system. Only the reserve officers who went through the year as an OYV understood the difficulties of the lower enlisted ranks. A major effort during the time in the ranks was an assessment of the Fähnrich. All officers dealing with the Fähnrich contributed to the appraisal that was then passed to the responsible battalion commander and from there to the regimental commander.
Step 5 — Be Promoted to Fähnrich if “All Went Well”.
The aspirant applied to the colonel that he was “qualified” and deserved a military qualification certificate (Dienstzeugnis) that was issued by the regimental commander based upon the Fähnrich’s appraisal. If approved by the colonel, the applicant was officially promoted to Fähnrich and paid a salary. He was also eligible to wear the silver sword knot (Portepee). Initially called Portepeefähnrich, that title was eliminated in 1899. For example, between 1892 and 1894, 59 percent of the cadets became Brevet Fähnrich, 10 percent Patent Fähnrich and about 33 percent were “Selekta.”
Step 6 — A Course at the Kriegsschule.
Cadet Abitur holders, Selekta cadets, and civilian Abitur holders who had been university students for a year were exempted from this requirement from the Kriegsschule. The ages of the attending students showed that longer civilian education took time and money; whereas, a man could skip the education and go into the commissioning system and start making money and seniority. The course at the Kriegsschule took nine months and prepared the officer candidate for the officer examination. During these nine months, the Fähnriche were taught tactics of the different arms, weaponry, fortification and field fortification, sketching and drawing, army organization (Truppenkunde) and military administration. The length of this course shortened as the need for officers became more pressing and cadets sought their commissions in a year. At the end of the course, the candidate took the officer’s exam. This course was eventually reduced from twelve to seven months in length.
Step 7 — Pass Officer Examination and Return to Regiment.
Selekta cadets went straight to Step Ten if they passed the officer exam. Passing was not a problem (98 percent passed with the re-take option). If indeed a candidate did fail, he entered the army as a Fähnrich. Some Fähnriche quit the service after failing examination. If a Fähnrich passed with very good marks, his officer’s patent was subsequently backdated to the date he officially left the Kriegsschule and was transferred back to the regiment. Obedience and attitude came before grades. The officers’ examination was considered far easier than the Fähnrich exam. At the regiment, the Fähnrich waited (briefly) for a vacancy and to complete the next steps.
Step 8 — Regimental Officers Balloted to See if They Agreed to Accept the Candidate.
Balloting made sure that only candidates with a desired social or family background were commissioned. [ Although mentioned in the contemporary literature, the balloting is not written down in the respective manual about officer selection.]
Selekta cadets did not have to undergo this process. Majority vetoes were final and were sent to the Kaiser for decision. If a candidate failed, he was either sent to another regiment for another try or to the reserves with a major stigma due to the veto. Few candidates failed, because it amounted to going against the colonel’s wishes. Some were rejected because of a lack of personal wealth, in which case the candidate was sent to another regiment without stigma.
Step 9 — Colonel Recommends to the Kaiser Promotion to Second Lieutenant.
The regimental commander reported the ballot to the Militärkabinett that prepared commissions and decided about the patent date. Newly commissioned officers received their patent, and that patent constituted their personal relationship to the King. The Fähnrich became a second lieutenant and a member of the social élite, except those in the artillery or engineers. These two branches considered the newly commissioned as supernumeraries until they had served one (artillery) or two (pioneer) years, attended technical school, and passed a qualifying exam. The nobility viewed technical schools as “schools for plumbers.” It is not surprising, therefore, that the nobles eschewed these branches.
Step 10 — Promotion is Officially “Gazetted”.
There were numerous rules for seniority and backdating dates of rank. It is important to look at the different methods of commissioning and understand the pluses and minuses. Generally, the ten steps took approximately 18 months after the Obersekunda year. Therefore a Fahnenjunker, or a cadet entering as a charakterisierter Fähnrich at the age of 17, could gain a commission at the approximate age of 18 ½ years. Selekta cadets stayed in the academy for an additional 12 months, but would be commissioned directly without a vote of officers—a full six months faster than a Fahnenjunker or other early graduating cadets. The Prima cadets seeking the Abitur stayed in the Academy for two additional years, but still faced the vote in step eight. Originally, date of rank was 24 months after the Obersekunda year. In February 1900, royal order eliminated this penalty when the date of rank of Prima cadets was backdated to equal the same date as of the Selekta cadets. A Prima cadet now had the Abitur necessary to continue studies at the university and the same early date of rank as a Selekta.
Part 5 - Spirit and Social Life
As a member of the élite of military officers, a man found himself in another world. The sovereigns of the four kingdoms governed promotions. Inspections, not examinations, determined suitability. With the exception of the General Staff, promotion through major took place within the regiment. Above the rank of major, there were centralized promotion lists. While there were no precise rules, promotion tended to be slow on average. A normal progression was eight years to first lieutenant, 14 years to captain, 25 to major, and 30 to lieutenant colonel. General Staff officers were usually promoted six years earlier than normal regimental officers. Seniority and noble connections both mattered. Officers were held to the highest standards, both inside and outside the confines of the post. An officer wore his uniform at all times. There were streets in Berlin where an officer was not allowed to smoke during the day. In fact, there were entire areas that were off-limits. Much of this policy was to keep officers away from the influence of socialists.
An officer relying on his military salary alone simply could not live in an appropriate style, because the salary was only one-fifth of that of his American counterpart. The uniform for an infantry lieutenant cost between 900 and 1,100 marks. The low salary caused shocking problems for most officers. While most guard and cavalry officers had to prove that they had a sufficient outside income prior to acceptance in the regiment, other officers tended to just do without. It was not unusual for an officer to be short of food or warmth, and they often failed to wear their coats in an effort to avoid wearing them out. Many regiments had a small fund to bail out officers who became short of funds. Most officers had to balance debt and the stigma attached to poor financial management. Aristocratic families usually had the money to grant pay supplements to their sons in officers’ careers. From commissioning, even infantry officers had to pay for two horses, uniforms, their side arms, etc. Becoming a cavalry officer was more expensive than it was for an infantry or artillery officer. The most expensive, when considering individual costs, certainly were the Garde Kürassier and the Gardes-du-Corps. Erich Ludendorff gives a very interesting account of his years as both an infantry lieutenant and captain—largely without any pay supplement by the family.
Through the rank of captain, army pay was hardly sufficient to support the officer, let alone adequate to support a family; therefore, promotion to the rank of major was usually called Majorsecke, which means that financially, “going around that corner,” would make his life much easier. Since most officers had to borrow money from their families, it was a common saying that after successfully passing the meager years, officers had “Schulden wie ein Stabsoffizier” (debts like a field-grade officer).
The Kaiser was personally aware of the burden of extra expenses required of officers. As he attempted to enlarge the officer corps in 1890, he gave an order that officers in infantry, foot artillery, and engineer regiments should be required to have no less than 45 marks per month of additional private income. He expected field artillery officers to have 70 marks per month, and those of the cavalry 150 marks per month. Bearing in mind that a newly commissioned lieutenant earned only 125 marks per month, there was no conceivable way to make ends meet on a salary alone.
Low pay with high status meant that marriage had to be a business deal in which the woman brought the “bacon” to the table. It was not unusual to use a marriage agency. A normal practice was for the bride’s father to assume the officer’s existing debts. The regimental commander had to approve the marriage to ensure the woman had at least an equal social background, enough money, and an unblemished record.
The courting process was an interesting one. In the upper middle classes, attendance at a party or ball depended on the regiment that was garrisoned nearby. The host was responsible for ensuring that officers attended, or it reflected poorly on him. The most desirable dancing partners were lieutenants. Guard officers were particularly sought-after, while socially those of the “lesser” branches like artillery and engineers, were decidedly also-rans.
Class distinction also entered the equation. A Württemberg officer who was non-noble but had a very rich, non-noble wife, i.e., the daughter of a Berlin publisher, could not take his wife to any formal events because of her background. Perhaps this exclusion contributed to the rarity of smiles on German brides in their wedding pictures. Or, it could have been cultural, but it might also have been a function of dental care or the lack thereof. There were also restrictions on interfaith marriages. Prussian officers were required to raise their children as Protestants. This policy conflicted directly with the guidance of the Catholic Church.
Part 6 - The Code of Honor
There was a constitutional and legal question about who disciplined the army. In the opinion of the War Minister, only strict adherence to the code of honor could maintain the reliability of the officer corps. The question really revolved around whether legal jurisdiction of the army fell under the command of the Kaiser alone or under the jurisprudence of the Reichstag.
There were two separate court systems: the civil courts (controlled by the Minister of Justice who was responsive to the Reichstag) and the honor court (influenced by the Minister of War and made up of officers of the regiment). Military officers, according to the army, were supposed to take their grievances to an honor court where the two antagonists were of honorable status. The decision of the honor court made up of other officers was binding and took precedence over any decision in a civil court. The regiment annually elected the honor court, which consisted of a captain and two lower ranking officers. The constitutional underpinning was that military officers were not liable to the Minister of Justice and the civil courts, but rather would work out their issues in an honor court. Officers were duty bound to shake hands and try to solve the disagreement. If that did not work, the honor court would try to settle the dispute non-violently.
The final option to restore an officer’s honor was a duel, whereby he could prove his worth. Officers subject to the code of honor were expected to duel, but the issue was convoluted, because duels were not only illegal, but also were officially quasi-discouraged by a cabinet ordinance the Kaiser issued 1 January 1897. Nevertheless, unwillingness to duel showed unreliability, and anyone refusing to duel would be drummed out of the army. The disgraced officer was not simply removed from the officer corps but excluded from the officer caste (Offizierstand). The individual became a non-person, forfeiting his pension and the right to wear a uniform. He could not use his old title or rank. Redemption was practically impossible until the actual casualties of the Great War began mounting and officials could look the other way. Decisions by the honor court were final, subject to the approval of the Kaiser. History shows that regular officers wounded in duels received pensions. Reserve officers dueled much more commonly than regular officers in an attempt to mimic their respected active brothers. Some officers viewed one-year volunteers as not worthy of a duel. Preference for dueling was given to those who were members of dueling fraternities.
The constitutional question of who disciplined the army never came to a head. The Army won one major test case. This revolved around a military commentator who was a retired officer. Was a retired officer subject to civil court or the honor court? The officer in question was Oberst Gädke, a retired colonel a.D., and a popular columnist, who had commanded a field artillery regiment. Gädke used his title of Oberst and wrote some things that irked the Kaiser. The objective in the honor court case was to deny the defendant the use of the title Oberst and the right to wear the uniform. The military’s claim was that Gädke was still under their jurisdiction and would be for his lifetime. The War Minister’s opinion was that the Kaiser alone granted the title, and the Kaiser had the right to withdraw it. An honor court so decided in February 1904. Things dragged on in different courts for another year. In 1905, the civil jury court decided that he was not guilty of using a title without authority. The Supreme Royal Court of Justice decided in 1906 that courts of honor had no jurisdiction over retired officers since the subjects were no longer constitutionally in the army. The fact Gädke had accepted the right to wear the uniform and the honors that go with the apparel when he left the army could under no circumstances imply that he agreed to the regulations governing courts of honor.
The War Minister argued that retired officers were part of the army. His justification included the fact that regular soldiers saluted retired officers; therefore, they had to accept the officer’s code of honor and the decisions of the court of honor. This affair finally ended in 1908 with Oberst Gädke having lost his title.
The even bigger test case was related to the trials over the Zabern Affair and in specific the role of the regimental Colonel involving active duty troops in Lou of the police force. There was also the issue of, could the military intervene in a civil jurisdiction? This was never settled as in the start of the war took precedence.
Part 7 - Reserve and Landwehr Officers
The active-duty officers described above differed significantly from reserve officers. Active officers received their commissions and with that honor went a certain respect and admiration. Reserve officers followed a different route to commissioning. Once commissioned, they tended to try very hard to mimic the regular officers. The reserve commission was considered the “open door” to many advantages in private life. For the most part they had served as OYVs and were recommended by their company commander as potential reserve officers. Preparation and training amounted to two periods of annual training, each lasting eight weeks. The reserve officer corps of the corps district would then vote on them. If accepted, they would gain a commission and serve as a lieutenant of the reserve.
The career of Friedrich Wolfgang Schmitt–Scharf illustrates the point and assists in the understanding of the following section. Born in October 1869, he became a one-year volunteer in the Kgl. Bayr. 2. Feldartillerie- Regiment Horn in October 1888 at the age of 19. As a one-year volunteer, he was promoted to the rank of Gefreiter in January 1889. He was further promoted to Unteroffizier in July of that year and after his year was over in October, he was released into the reserves. Two years later in August 1891, he was promoted to staff sergeant in a mounted unit (Vizewachtmeister) and was promoted to second lieutenant of the reserves in November 1891, after finishing his two annual training and preparation periods.
Nine years later in March of 1900, he was promoted to Oberleutnant. Five years after that in February of 1905, he was made a captain. That same year, at the age of 36, he was transferred into the 1st contingent of the Landwehr. When the war broke out in 1914, he was made commander of a Landwehr company, and in 1915 promoted to characteristic (temporary) major and held various posts until his release from the Army in 1919.
Part 8 - Wartime Officers
The wartime shortage of second lieutenants was meant to be filled by promoting retired Vizefeldwebel or Feldwebel to the rank of sergeant major lieutenant (Feldwebelleutnant). If the candidate had 12 years of service in the reserves or eight years of service in the Landsturm, he could be appointed to officer deputy (Offizier-Stellvertreter). Such officer deputies were never intended to command more than a platoon. While they were treated as officers in the field, they were not permitted the privileges of permanent commissioned rank. Immediately upon demobilization or discharge, they reverted at once to their former rank. These ranks were not used extensively until 1914, which begged the question as to why not. The Kaiser issued no fewer than two cabinet orders (AKOs) in late 1914 clarifying the rank of Offizier-Stellvertreter. There continues to be controversy over whether a person holding the rank of Offizier-Stellvertreter was considered an officer or a noncommissioned officer. It was possible for an Offizier-Stellvertreter to be promoted to the rank of Feldwebelleutnant. Additionally, because of a mistake in an English language publication, German Military Terms and Abbreviations issued by GHQ in France in April 1917, there are notes as well as references that Feldwebelleutnant was “only appointed in war for depot and garrison troops”. Feldwebelleutnants were indeed appointed only in wartime but certainly not only for depot and garrison troops. A cursory glance at any wartime regimental history or the published Verlustlisten will show their appointment and deployment in first line units. This promotion was an appointment, not a rank. It entitled them to nothing other than increased responsibility. This appointment was a very poor deal after they reverted to their previous rank.
Part 9 - Retirement
Military service was not over quickly. Most officers were “promoted” upon retirement. Often the phrase charakterisiert (brevet promotion) is attached to a specific rank. If a person served a certain number of years, this “promotion” was granted upon retirement. It did not affect his pension because that was based on his permanent rank. The abbreviation z.D. after a name, Oberleutnant z.D. Müller for example, stands for zur Disposition (on disposition). An officer in this status was in effect a retired officer who had agreed to be available for further service or assignment as required. It was normal for an officer z.D. to be employed in peacetime in uniformed positions such as Landwehr District Commanders or Landwehr District Officers. They were also given front-line assignments on mobilization.
Another abbreviation frequently seen in connection with retired officers is außer Dienst (a.D.) or out of service. They, too, were often recalled or volunteered their services upon mobilization. It is confusing in that a man could be promoted in that status as well as use the abbreviation a.D. even when serving in a recalled status. There was another group of officers known as nichtregimentierte Offiziere. This term refers to those officers serving extra-regimentally in special corps or appointments such as the following:
General Staff;
Adjutants of formations from brigade upwards;
Adjutants to Royal Princes;
Permanent staff of military establishments such as the War Academy, War Schools, Artillery and Engineer School, Cadet Corps, NCO schools, etc.;
Fortress governments;
Train Depots, etc.
For the most part these were officers serving outside their original arm of service or regiment in a special staff or instructors’ appointment.
All members of the army officer corps were entitled to receive a pension if they could not continue their military career after at least ten years of active service. Officers leaving the army after less than ten years due to a disability or other health reasons received during active service were also entitled to receive a pension. In these cases, the pension would be granted only during the disability or invalidity that kept these officers from joining active service. Officers leaving the army before completing ten years of service without a pension entitlement could receive a pension as an act of grace if they were in need due to poverty. This rule was only applied if those officers were officially declared to be unfit for service. In these cases, the pension did not exceed 20/60 (20 x the sixtieth part) of their last pensionable annual salary (pensionsfähiges Diensteinkommen). Only salaries, allowances, or bonuses received for longer than one year were counted as pensionable. The pension amount was calculated based upon position, rank and years of service. After ten years of service, it was about 20/60 of the last pensionable salary and rose with each full year of service by one further sixtieth part. After 30 years of service and from the position of a regimental commander, this increase was reduced to 1/120 of the last pensionable annual salary. Usually, the “target pension” for retirement after a full life of service was about 2/3 (average)–3/4 (maximum) of the last pensionable annual salary.
